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](n John Irving's novel, The World According to Garp,' nurse Jenny
Fields wants a child but does not want to be involved with a man. Her
ideal situation is "a mother alone with a new baby, and a life ahead of
them, just the two of them. A baby with no strings attached. An almost
virgin birth!"2 She decides she needs a man "who would only need to try
once to make her pregnant - just that, and nothing more." Jenny Fields
finds that the dying, semi-comatose patient of hers, Technical Sergeant
(T.S.) Garp, is suitable. She arouses him until he has an erection, and
gets "his last shot" before he dies.3 In her fictional auto-biography she
explained:
Of course I felt something when he died. But the best of him was
inside me. That was the best thing for both of us, the only way
he could go on living, the only way I wanted to have a child.
That the rest of the world finds this an immoral act only shows
me that the rest of the world doesn't respect the rights of an in-
dividual.4
Jenny Fields did not find it immoral "to steal" the dying man's sperm
to have a child. What difference should it make to her or to the resulting
child that she conceived in that matter? Jenny Fields did not force the
dying man to have sexual intercourse with her, she only facilitated the
act which the man clearly enjoyed as he died. The man's sperm should
be considered a "gift" to her. Why should this be wrong? Is it not suffi-
cient that a child might be born? Should limits on pro-creative rights be
justified? While the technology involved in the cryopreservation of
1. See generally JOHN IRVING, THE WORLD ACCORDING TO GARP 1-31 (Bal-
lantine Books, 1978).
2. Id. at 6.
3. See id. at 4.
4. Id. at 29.
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gametes and embryos is almost commonly accepted, the ethical and so-
cial issues raised are complex and controversial. At stake are the rights
and obligations of gamete providers, the consequences to the living par-
ticipants in the pregnancy, and possible effects of posthumous repro-
ductive practices on the children they produce. 5
This Article addresses these questions in the spirit and humanist phi-
losophy of George J. Annas by adopting his positions on fairness, jus-
tice, human dignity, and human rights. Additionally, this Article exam-
ines cases of posthumous reproduction with sperm, eggs, and embryos,
including posthumous pregnancy. Further, this Article explains why
posthumous reproduction is problematic. Finally, this Article concludes
with public policy recommendations for the regulation of posthumous
reproduction.
I. POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION
Posthumous births regularly occur when the husband or male partner
has died from illness or accident during the pregnancy but before the
child is born. In these tragic circumstances, prospective parents do not
anticipate having a posthumous child. On the contrary, they expect to
live long enough to rear their children and fulfill their parental obliga-
tions. However, posthumous births are acts of fate. As an act of fate,
these births raise unique ethical and legal questions because the child
born is a rightful heir of the deceased father.
Posthumous reproduction, on the other hand, is a deliberate decision
to produce a child after one, or both, would-be parents die. The feasibil-
ity of reproducing after death emerged in 1954 when Bunge and
Sherman demonstrated that human spermatozoa, when frozen and
thawed, could be used for insemination to produce a normal child.6 In
the 1970s, private sperm banks were established to enable men who an-
ticipated either a vasectomy or cancer treatment to cryopreserve their
sperm with the intention of using it later. This cryopreservation of sperm
rapidly became acceptable for reasons other than those related to the
medical field. Now, virtually any man who can afford it may have his
sperm frozen and stored for later use. Likewise, virtually any woman,
for almost any reason, can use donated sperm for insemination. As a
5. See Evelyne Shuster, A Child at All Costs: Posthumous Reproduction and
the Meaning of Parenthood, HUM. REPROD., Nov. 1994, at 2182-85.
6. See R.G. Bunge, Fertilizing Capacity of Frozen Human Spermatozoa, 172
NATURE 767, 769 (1953).
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re:sult, these commercial gamete banks have become a source of sperm,
ova, and embryos for any consumer's use. #
Embryos produced in vitro, while both members of a couple are alive,
may be frozen for later use by the couple. This ability to cryopreserve
sperm makes it possible for children to be conceived long after their
genetic father dies. However, problems arise in two separate situations:
when one partner, or both, die before using the embryos, or when the
surviving partner wants to establish a pregnancy against the previously
expressed wishes of the dead partner. These problems arise because the
parents fail to leave instructions about what to do with the embryos in
the event one, or both, of the parents die.8 Who should decide on the
disposition of these "orphaned" or "abandoned" embryos? 9 Should the
emrbryos be kept in storage, used for research, anonymously donated to
infertile couples, or discarded?
Gamete banks are generally not notified when a gamete depositor
dies. In the event that they are, the specimens are not withdrawn from
7. See John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027
(1994). The author suggests that a surviving partner's right to use a deceased's
sperm should depend on whether she is considered the legal owner of the sperm
urnder state property and inheritance law, not on whether the decedent specifically
authorized the use of his sperm after death. See id. at 1045. Robertson argues that
the surviving partner might have a right to use the sperm even if the decedent left
specific instructions opposing posthumous reproduction. See id. at 1040-45. See
also N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 295, 295-
9[; (1998).
8. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Ethical Furor Erupts in Britain: Should Embryos
Be Destroyed?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al; Gina Kolata, Medicine's Trou-
bling Bonus: Surplus of Human Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, at Al.
9. See George P. Smith, Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A Medical,
Legal, and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27, 28 (1995). This case involved a
wealthy American couple, the Rios, who died in an airplane crash after leaving two
erbryos frozen in an Australian gamete bank. See id at 27-28. The bank was
unsure whether it. was appropriate to destroy the embryos, donate them to another
couple, or give them to the Rios' family. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note
7, at 310-11; see also SHERMAN' ELIAS & GEORGE J. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE
GENETICS AND THE LAW 234 (1987). In California, the parents of a single woman
who died from leukemia after freezing her embryos created with her eggs and do-
nor sperm, searched for a surrogate to gestate the embryos. See Evelyne Shuster,
Dead Parent Cannot Parent, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 1, 1998, at 21. The parents
claimed they had a right to be grandparents, and their deceased daughter the right
to be a mother. See id. The parents reported that they found a surrogate who be-
cEane pregnant after an embryo transfer, but later miscarried. See id.
. 1999]
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the programs.' 0 If a sperm donation is anonymous, it is generally as-
sumed that it makes no difference to the person requesting the sperm, or
to the child conceived with the sperm, that the depositor is deceased."
However, when men store their sperm for use by an intimate partner,
and die before the sperm is used, questions about the disposition of the
sperm arise.' 2 These disputes arise when a sperm bank refuses to release
the sperm according to the sperm depositor's directive, or when family
members disagree with a directive. Therefore, the dispute focuses on
whether specific instructions by the sperm depositor are sufficient to
justify the posthumous use of sperm.' 3 Should the sperm be discarded,
released to a widow, a girlfriend, a parent, or other significant person, or
should it be anonymously donated?
II. POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION WITH SPERM: CASES IN
FRANCE AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Procreative decisions are private and a fundamental right of adults.'
4
Yet, whether these decisions survive death remains unclear in light of
recent court decisions.' 5
10. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, supra note 7, at 295.
11. See id at 295-96. Some people choosing donor insemination might actu-
ally prefer a deceased donor to avoid the risk that the donor might someday attempt
to assert parental rights. See id,
12. Many gamete banks' policies require that the semen be destroyed after the
donor dies, if he left no instructions authorizing the posthumous use of his sperm.
See Donald E. Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The
Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J. L. & HEALTH 229, 243-44 (1986); see also
Timothy F. Murphy, Sperm Harvesting and Postmordem Fatherhood, 9 BIOETHICS
380, 381-98 (1995).
13. See Sheri Gilbert, Fatherhood From the Grave. An Analysis of Postmor-
tem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 549 (1993). Some gamete banks will
release a man's sperm to his widow even in the absence of specific instructions.
See id
14. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that a
state cannot prohibit married couples from using contraception); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right to privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child."). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, more specifically, sexual rela-
tions between persons of the same sex).
15. See Shuster, supra note 9, at 21.
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In France, a dispute surrounding the embryos of Alain Parpalaix and
his wife Corinne illustrated the difficulty of this ethical decision.'
6
Fearing the loss of his reproductive capacity, Parpalaix deposited his
sperm at the Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme Humain
(CECOS), a government funded research center and sperm bank, before
undergoing treatment for testicular cancer. 7 After Parpalaix's death,
Corinne requested that CECOS release the sperm so that she could use it
for artificial insemination. 18 CECOS refused. 19 CECOS argued that
while Parpalaix wanted to preserve his sperm in case of infertility, it was
unclear whether he would have consented to the use of his sperm after
death.20 In the absence of clear authorization from Parpalaix, CECOS
claimed that there was no obligation to release the sperm to Corinne.2'
According to CECOS, sperm is both "genetic material" and "an indi-
visible part of the body" that cannot be distributed without explicit in-
struction from the sperm depositor.22 Corinne argued that her husband's
intention in storing his sperm could only have been to make her the
mother of his child and that no other reason could explain the storage of
his sperm.23 By denying her the use of the sperm, Corinne argued,
CECOS violated not only her husband's implicit wishes, but also her
protected right to procreate.24
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Creteil,25 while ignoring the po-
tential inheritance and property issues also present in the case, focused
its attention on the sperm and what it represented to Parpalaix. The court
characterized the sperm as "the seed of life tied to a fundamental liberty
of a person to procreate or to avoid procreation." 26 The court insisted
that "this fundamental right -must be protected and cannot be subject to
the rules of a mere contract," and therefore, "the fate of the sperm must
16. See Parpalaiz v. CECOS, T.G.I. de Creteil, 1 ch. civ., Aug. 1, 1984, Gaz.









25. Mine. Claire G. v. CECOS, T.G.I. de Toulouse, 4 ch. civ., Mar. 26, 1991,
62 LaSemaine Jurdique 21807.
26. Id.
1999] 1 405
406 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:401
be decided by the person from whom it came. ', 27 Thus, the court deter-
mined that Parpalaix's intent and "deep desire" to make his wife "the
mother of a common child" was "unequivocal, if not absolute. 28
In reaching this conclusion, the court also recognized that sperm
banks can refuse to release the sperm of a depositor after his death if the
sperm bank informs its client in advance of that policy. Had CECOS
told Parpalaix that it would not release the sperm for posthumous in-
semination, CECOS would have been justified in its refusal to release
the sperm. Because it failed to do so, however, the court ruled that
CECOS must release the sperm to Corinne.
29
As a result of this opinion, CECOS adopted gamete policy guidelines.
When another cancer patient, Michel G., also deposited his sperm with
CECOS, he signed a written agreement which stated that "his sperm will
only be used in his presence and with his explicit consent. 3° Upon his
death, Michel's wife Claire requested that CECOS release the sperm to
her. In denying her the use of Michel's sperm, Claire claimed that
CECOS deprived her of her fundamental right to procreate. She con-
tended that her husband's act of storing sperm implicitly recognized his
private decision to have a child by her.
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Toulouse rejected those argu-
ments, saying that "a right to procreate is not a right to a child."''0 No
one is obligated to do "all that is technologically feasible to establish a
pregnancy. 32 Because CECOS informed its client in advance that it
would not release the stored sperm to a widow, CECOS had no obliga-
tion to honor the request.33 Posthumous reproduction, the court stated,
tends to devalue children and undercut their moral agency by treating
them only as a means to someone else's end.34 The court, while refusing
to be a party to the making of "souvenir babies," ruled that CECOS was
justified in its policy decision not to engage in the posthumous transfer









35. See Mne. Claire G. at 62.
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husband's sperm for insemination.
36
In the United States, the only reported case of posthumous insemina-
tion involved William Everett Kane.37 Kane was a prominent California
attorney who, before committing suicide at the age of forty-eight, de-
posited his sperm at a Cryobank in Los Angeles. Before his death, Kane
left the instruction that his sperm should be used by his girlfriend of five
years, Deborah Ellen Hecht.3" In addition, Kane had two college-aged
children with his former wife but was living with Deborah.39 Unlike
Parpalaix, Kane explained that his decision to commit suicide was the
reason for the storage of his sperm. He signed an agreement with Cryo-
bank that read, "Cryobank shall release the semen to Deborah Hecht and
her physician. 40 In an unusual letter to his existing children and to any
posthumous offspring he might have, Kane wrote:
I address this letter to my children, although I have only two, it
may be that Deborah will decide, as I hope she will, to have a
child by me after my death. I have assiduously generated frozen
sperm samples for that eventuality. If she does, then, this letter
is also for my posthumous offspring as well with the thought
that I loved you in my dreams, even though I never got to see
you born.4'
Branding the desire to father a child after death as selfish, "egotistic
and irresponsible," Kane's children requested the destruction of all of
Kane's cryogenically preserved spermatozoa
to prevent not only the birth of children who will never know
their father and never even have the slightest hope of being
raised in a traditional family, but also the disruption of existing
families by after-born children, and the additional emotional,
psychological and financial stress on those family members al-
ready in existence.42
A trial court granted the request, and ordered the sperm destroyed.
43
Hecht appealed, claiming that Kane's will clearly stated his intent that
she be the mother of his posthumous children. The will read, "I bequeath
36. See id.
37. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275
(1993).
38. Seeid. at840.
39. See id. at 841.
40. Id. at 840.
41. Id. at 841.
42. Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 844.
43. See id.
1999]
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all right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of my
sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to
Deborah Ellen Hecht." 44 Based on this clause, Ms. Hecht maintained
that the sperm was a special "gift" from Kane to her before his death.
Hecht claimed that not recognizing this "gift" is a violation of her right
to privacy and Kane's right to direct the way he wanted his sperm used.
Relying almost exclusively on the Parpalaix case, the appellate court
characterized the sperm as "reproductive material, a unique type of
property because of [its] potential for human life. 4 5 The court believed
that Kane's intention was clearly to have posthumous offspring. Since
Deborah Hecht consented to conceive a child using the deceased's
sperm, the court decided it could not interfere with a family-making
decision about whether, when, and with whom to have children. In re-
versing the trial court's decision, the appellate court ruled that sperm
depositors may determine the disposition of their gametes after death.46
This court deemed it appropriate to honor Kane's wishes to have post-
humous offspring because the Cryobank obtained the voluntary consent
of both gamete providers. Thus, the court found that using the sperm of
a dead man to reproduce makes no difference to the person receiving the
sperm, and has no serious adverse consequences to the existing family,
the living participants in the pregnancy, or to the potential child. Is the
Kane court right?
A. Values in Reproduction
Sperm are not like vital organs. They are renewable, and can be
bought, sold, donated, stored, or simply wasted. Most Americans do not
view commerce in sperm as particularly wrong, and would agree that
gametes, both sperm and ova, have less value than embryos. Sperm be-
long to men. Men have a right to donate or sell their sperm during their
lifetime because the right to avoid reproduction, and implicitly the right
to reproduce, are fundamental rights. Denial of either right creates sig-
nificant burdens on individuals and affects their lives in ways that they
alone best appreciate. But the right to reproduce is fundamentally a
negative, not a positive right. It creates no reproductive obligation on
others. A man can give specific instructions concerning the disposition
of his sperm after his death, but no one is actually obligated to honor his
44. Id.
45. Id. at 855.
46. See id. at 836.
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wishes. To say otherwise would be the equivalent of saying that a man
has a right to a fertile woman. Further, this would require the state to
provide a fertile wife to a man so that he could exercise his "reproduc-
tive right." However, no such right exists.
The state can prohibit specific reproductive arrangements, such as
commercial surrogacy, as a matter of public policy, if it finds that the
arrangement destroys moral values and societal interests.47 The rationale
a state uses to interfere in these arrangements is to protect the values and
interests living people have in reproduction and the possible unintended
effects these arrangements may have on a pregnancy. Accordingly, we
must identify the values and interests individuals have in reproduction
before reaching a conclusion about the propriety of posthumous repro-
duction.
People value reproduction for the experience it entails, including birth
and rearing offspring. Reproductive decisions are ordinarily made be-
cause of individuals' desire to have genetic offspring and to form a
family that they may enjoy. But Kane will never know of "his" child's
existence, or whether he even had another child. He will never assume
any of the most basic responsibilities of fatherhood, nor will he face
personal or financial demands made by his genetic offspring. At best, he
might have felt some happiness, while alive, in thinking he could be-
come a "father" after death. Although most people identify happiness as
the highest good in life, Kane's pre-suicidal appreciation of happiness is
so far removed from what people ordinarily experience when they de-
cide to become parents that it cannot warrant serious consideration.
Therefore, the interests of a suicidal person cannot be equated with the
interests of persons who intend to rear their children.48
Kane offered his girlfriend the gift of his sperm in contemplation of
his death. This offering - gift mortis causa - may be seen as both a
loving expression and also as Kane's hope of maintaining a relationship
with Deborah Hecht from the grave. Her acceptance of the gift shows
her devotion to Kane's memory. But the child that may result from the
gift-exchange would have no such memory to honor, no existing rela-
tionship to maintain and no new relationship to establish with a genetic
father. It seems unfair from the child's perspective to be conceived as a
47. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN
BIOETHICS 61 (1993); GEORGE J. ANNAS, JUDGING MEDICINE 66 (1998).
48. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 4 (1994).
1999]
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"loving memorial" or a product of a gift-exchange.
49
Kane could argue, nonetheless, that his interest in posthumous in-
semination through this gift of sperm was to ensure his genetic survival.
This genetic interest is highly valued by individuals, who suffer, an-
guish, and endure lengthy and costly infertility treatment, to have a child
genetically related to one parent. It has even been suggested that genetic
survival is the only valued reproductive goal: "[Y]oung men [should]
agree to vasectomy as a new form of male contraception .... The 'nor-
mal' reproductive state of an adult [would then] be infertility, a subse-
quent deliberate step being needed for fertilization."5 ° Men could decide
in advance what use would be made of their frozen sperm. Posthumous
insemination could be an attractive option for those who wish to ensure
the survival of their genes. In fact, posthumous insemination is valued
by many people as a way to transcend death itself. Based on this ration-
ale, interest in genetic survival cannot be easily dismissed.
Transcending death may have been Pamela Maresca's only true com-
fort after her husband died in a car accident at the age of twenty-two.5'
Pam decided to retrieve his sperm in order to have his child.52 The day
of the funeral, she gathered her in-laws and friends into the very living
room where she was married and told them, "[W]e've got a chance for
Manny to live on, to make him live again. It's going to happen and it's
.49. The French anthropologist, Marcel Mauss explores the idea of the "gift-
exchange" in archaic societies, extended to social life. Mauss stresses the social
obligation of the gift-exchange, and the demand for reciprocity, under the appear-
ance of generosity, and the freedom of accepting, refusing, and returning a gift.
See generally MARCEL MAUSs, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE
IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (Ian Cunninson, trans., 1954).
50. Carl Djerassi & S.P. Leibo, A New Look at Male Contreception, 370
NATURE 11, 11-12 (1994).
51. See S. Fishman, Inconceivable, VOGUE, Dec. 1994, at 306. A recent study
surveyed the prevalence of postmortem sperm retrieval in the United States and
Canada. The authors noted that although requests for postmortem retrieval are still
relatively small in number, they are still "greater than anticipated" and are increas-
ing in the United States. No requests were reported in Canada. American requests
came from spouses, family members, significant others, and friends. It is not
known whether any of these requests resulted in the actual use of the sperm for
insemination. None of the facilities surveyed had policies or guidelines to deal
with requests for postmortem sperm retrieval. See Susan M. Kerr, Postmortem
Sperm Procurement, 152 J. UROLOGY 2154, 2154-56 (1997).
52. See Kerr, supra note 51, at 2154.
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going to work." Everyone cheered and clapped.53 The sperm bank di-
rector, Dwight Brunoehler, had no ambivalence about taking the sperm
from a dead man for reproduction without his consent. He believed that
[s]perm is a piece of real property, like a car or a house. Pam, as
far as I am concerned is the owner. Single women already qual-
ify for fertility treatment programs. The way I look at Pam's re-
quest is a case of a single woman with an unusual source of
sperm.
Pamela's husband will not go on living. His genes, however, may sur-
vive if there is a successful pregnancy. Although individuals are not
reducible to their genes, they, just as animals, use all sorts of reproduc-
tive strategies to maximize the spread of their genes. As Richard
Dawkins writes in The Selfish Gene:
Ideally, what an individual would like is to copulate with as
many members of the opposite sex as possible, leaving the part-
ner in each case to bring up the children. We,. and all other ani-
mals, are machines created by our genes. [Our] genes have sur-
vived in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect
certain qualities in our genes. [A] predominant quality to be ex-
pected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene
selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual be-
havior.
55
Is ensuring genetic survival wrong? Surely, individuals procreate for a
variety of reasons. Some have children with the intention of using them
as gifts to another child by using the new child as a donor for a sick sib-
ling. 6 Others conceive to save a marriage, or in an attempt to experience
love unconditionally. Still others have children to feel needed, or to ful-
fill expected social behaviors. Yet, while society tolerates selfish and
potentially abusive parental behaviors, it does not prohibit irresponsible
individuals from having children. Is the reason for having a child post-
humously really so different from other reasons people have for decid-
ing to procreate? Are there values being ignored or swept aside? Is there
harm being done to children when people are taken in by the ruthless
game .of genetic survival? Is there really any harm in honoring Kane's
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. RicHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 1 (1989).
56. In 1990, the Ayala family in California deliberately conceived, and carried
to term, a child so that they could obtain bone marrow for an existing child with
leukemia. See Girl is Born: Conceived to Save her Sister's Life, PHILA. INQ., Nov.
22, 1994, at A16.
1999]
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intent to have posthumous offspring?
B. Harming and Wronging
Society may forbid a person from using a specific procreative strategy
to prevent harm to others. This is a particular application of John Stuart
Mill's "Liberty Principle":
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant .... The only part of the conduct of
anyone for which an individual is amenable to society is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns him-
self, his independence is, of right, absolute."
However, there are conceptual problems in applying the "harm princi-
ple" to posthumous reproduction. This is because it is difficult to speak
of causing harm to a child who is not yet conceived. The not-yet-
conceived cannot be the bearer of moral rights or a proper object of
moral concern. Arguably, prior to actual conception and birth, any dis-
cussion about harm to the expected child can only be in terms of coun-
terfactual hypotheticals and is thus, inconclusive.5 8
In the Kane case, Deborah Hecht has only two options: go forward
with the insemination, which could lead to a child being born, or not use
the sperm, which meant that a genetic child of Kane's would never be
conceived. She may act selfishly, or selflessly, when she decides to
carry out Kane's posthumous parental project. She may be captivated by
the ruthless game of genetic survival as a gift to her lover. But she can-
not harm a child who is yet to be conceived. The not-yet-conceived has
no interest in the existence to protect. To say otherwise would be the
equivalent of saying that Deborah Hecht harmed a not-yet-conceived
child by using the sperm. If, however, she does not use the sperm,
Kane's child would have no possibility of being conceived. The con-
ceptual and real difficulty in assessing harm to the not-yet-conceived is
that the act that could harm a child is the very act that causes the child to
57. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (1978).
58. See JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS 3-36 (1992). This essay examines John Stuart Mill's often cited "harm
principle," and its implication for civil and liability. See id. He tests it on concep-
tually hard cases when the wrongful causative conduct occurs before birth, and the
harmed state that is its upshot consists in being born in an impaired condition. See
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be born.
Once the child is born, he or she may claim that conception and birth
in this way is so wrong that she or he would have preferred not to be
born. But this seems very unlikely. The child is not likely to regret being
born, although she or he may regret the circumstances surrounding the
birth. A healthy child is always better off being born than not being born
at all.59 If-this is true, any reproductive strategy that causes a child to be
born, or any option that maximizes the number of healthy children being
born, can be justified from the perspective of the children.
Kane wanted his girlfriend to be impregnated with his sperm, a desire
that most people today would find acceptable. But what if he had left
instructions that his sperm be used to impregnate a thousand women for
the next ten generations? This would certainly maximize the spread of
his sperm, and may result in the birth of more children. Additionally,
suppose that Kane left instruction that his sperm be used to impregnate
his daughter or a gorilla. Everyone would agree that such a directive
should not be honored because the birth of a child is neither an uncondi-
tional good, nor an unconditional goal. Wanting a child is not sufficient
to justify all feasible reproductive strategies. Some reproductive options
are so morally and socially offensive that most people would find them
unacceptable. 60 Both nature and society impose limits on the number of
59. See Robertson supra note 48, at 75. John Robertson points to "the major
[problem] with finding harm to offspring in these circumstances, and hence, with
claiming that the reproduction is irresponsible." Id. The problem, he argues, is that
in many cases the alleged harm to offspring occurs from birth itself.
Either the harm is congenital and unavoidable if birth is to occur, or
the harm is avoidable after birth occurs . . .. Preventing harm would
mean preventing the birth of the child whose interests one is trying
to protect. Yet a child's interests are hardly protected by preventing
the child's existence. If the child has no way to be born or raised
free of that harm, a person is not injuring the child by enabling her
to be born in the circumstances of concern.
ROBERTSON, supra note 48, at 75-76 (emphasis added). This commentator stresses
that a child is always better off born than not, and thus nothing can harm the child
who would not be born but for what is a matter of concern. See id. Protecting
offspring by preventing their births, "prevents the birth of offspring whose life is a
net benefit to them, and is not always necessary to protect them in cases where their
life is truly wrongful." Id. This author adopts the same rationale toward human
cloning. See John A. Robertson, Human Cloning and the Challenge of Regulation,
339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 119, 119-22 (1998).
60. The news in 1997 that embryologist Ian Wilmut had cloned a sheep by
reprogramming one of its somatic cells to act as the nucleus of an egg was almost
universally greeted with horror. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, SOME CHOICE 3 (1998).
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children born from a single sperm specimen. As a limitation on this re-
productive capacity, society has rejected multiple simultaneous mar-
riages and recognizes no social value in certain other reproductive prac-
tices.
Posthumous reproduction cannot harm children. Yet, it can wrong
them by making genetic parent-child relationships impossible. Further, it
denies children the right to be born with two living parents. Posthumous
reproduction may also wrong women by promoting a view that women
are reducible to their reproductive functions. In a society where women
have a mandate for motherhood, the gift of sperm could create "a strong
obligation on [them] to use such a gift, no matter how deliberate, spon-
taneous and expressive the 'gift' appears to be.",6' Because women are
subjected to all sorts of psychological, cultural, and societal pressure to
be mothers, 62 the gift-exchange of sperm creates a strong moral, psy-
chological, and social imperative on some women to want, or at least
appear to want, the ability to bear children.
Such pressure was real in the Maresca case. Pam's mother-in-law said
that "she [would] be devastated if Pam decided not to be impregnated
with her son's sperm: [W]e want this baby born at all costs, and we are
hoping she will have his baby." 63 Women are sometimes perceived as
eternal mothers, and thus available for reproductive function. If Pam
decided "not to help her dead husband live on," her mother-in-law says
she will "use donor eggs and would carry her son's child."
The prospect of producing human clones with the same technique entails a call for
a ban on cloning by leaders around the world, including Ian Wilmut himself. See
id. Many see human cloning as a technique so perverse that it could destroy the
very fabric of what makes us human. See id. Further, human cloning is an insult to
the uniqueness of the human person, her identity, individuality, and freedom to
become all that she can. Id. See also George J. Annas, Why Should We Ban Hu-
man Cloning?, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 122, 122-25 (1998). Similarly, the news
that scientists from Worcester, Massachusetts used cloning techniques to create a
human embryo by placing DNA from a scientist's cheek and leg cells into a donor
cow egg was greeted with horror and repulsion. See Usha L. McFarling, Experts
Skeptical Cloning of Humans Could Be Prevented As Ethical Questions About it
Are Being Pondered, Scientists Are Racing Ahead Unrestricted, PHILA. INQ., Nov.
18, 1998, at A3.
61. MAUSS, supra note 49, at 7.
62. See Julien S. Murphy, Is Pregnancy Necessary?, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 181-97 (H.B. Holmes & L.M. Purdy, eds.
1992).
63. See Kerr, supra note 51, at 2154.
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Additionally, some women may not want to share their lives with a
man, but nonetheless want their sperm to procreate. This would wrong
men when they are reduced to biological necessities and valued only for
their sperm. To Jenny Fields, the dying man was only as good as his
sperm.
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that posthumous reproduction is
less about reproduction than about power and control. Men may try to
control reproductive events by providing directives on the disposition of
their sperm after they die. Refusal to receive or return the gift of sperm
may cause social disapproval, and be seen as a refusal of social rela-
tions.64 Some women may want to have complete reproductive control
and rearing responsibilities. They could play various unfair games with
men to achieve conception.65 In this game of power and control, children
tend to be treated as mere commodities.
III. WOMEN IN POSTHUMOUS PREGNANCY AND
REPRODUCTION: A UNIQUE REPRODUCTIVE MODEL
Arguably, for gender equality, if men are permitted to reproduce post-
humously, women should also be able to have genetic children after they
die.66 The use of ova for posthumous reproduction raises problems
comparable to the posthumous use of sperm. Should ova be used at all?
There is, however, an unique difference - the requirement of a woman to
achieve pregnancy. What should be done if the deceased woman left
instructions that a specific woman gestate her fertilized eggs, and the
man who contributed the sperm wants somebody else? Should her di-
rective be followed? The male model provides no answer.
Pregnancy and childbirth are unique. Fathering a child cannot be
equated with the work involved in pregnancy and childbirth. Nor can
one reasonably equate the characteristics of freezing sperm for later use
64. See MAUSS, supra note 49, at 37-41.
65. Recently, in New Mexico, Peter Wallis sued his girlfriend, Kellie Smith,
for becoming pregnant by robbing him of his sperm when they had sexual inter-
course. Wallis argued that he did not give his sperm to her for the purpose of re-
production, and claimed that Smith "stole" the sperm from him to become pregnant
against his will. She argued that she could not have stolen his sperm. Rather, he
transferred it to her during voluntary sexual intercourse. This should be considered
a "gift" she said. See Barbara Vobejda, Court to Decide if a Man has a Right to
Choose Fatherhood, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1998, at Al.
66. See Kurt Weir, Italians Debate the Birth of a Baby from Egg of Woman
Now Deceased, PHILA. INQ., Jan. 12, 1995, at A3.
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with the characteristics of egg impregnation, which requires an invasive,
painful and risky, medical procedure. These reasons make it impossible
to apply the male reproductive model to women, either in posthumous
pregnancy, or in the use of ova from aborted fetuses. These instances
must have their own model and justification.
A. Posthumous Pregnancy: The Female
Corpse as Fetal Incubator
Posthumous pregnancy involves a deceased brain-dead pregnant
woman whose artificially maintained body is used to support her fetus.
67
Problems arise in this scenario when the pregnant woman makes her
wishes known in advance of death and her husband or partner, family,
and physicians disagree with the woman's directive. Furthermore, it may
be problematic when the woman has no such directive, and there is dis-
agreement over what should be done. Should the woman's vital func-
tions be maintained to ensure a safe delivery?
One such case involved a twenty-seven-year-old woman who, at
twenty-two weeks of gestation, delivered a surviving infant sixty-three
days after the diagnosis of brain death. 68 This case creates a true di-
lemma. On the one hand, there is an existing fetus whose interest in sur-
vival must be considered; on the other hand, there is the woman whose
entire body is needed to ensure the fetus' survival. In posthumous in-
semination there is no object of moral concern other than the sperm.
This is not the case in posthumous pregnancy where the fetal-maternal
unit is such that it is impossible to consider the interests of the fetus
separately from those of the woman.
Decisions to sustain a dead pregnant woman for the sake of her fetus
have been ethically justified on utilitarian grounds. According to the
utility principle:
[M]aternal autonomy ceases with the mother's death, and thus
treatment that benefits the fetus can no longer violate her auton-
omy. The woman's explicit refusal to be maintained as a fetal
incubator, expressed before her death, does not in itself carry
moral weight against the possibility of fetal survival. The mother
67. See David R. Field et al., Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy, 260
JAMA 816, 822 (1988); William P. Dillon et al., Life Support and Maternal Brain
Death During Pregnancy, 248 JAMA 1089-91 (1982).
68. See Field et al., supra note 67, at 44.
1999] Posthumous Gifi of Life
is not harmed; no right of hers is violated and great good can be
done for another.69
Arguably, this is an instance of "the medical rescue of the fetus from
death, a long tradition in Western society. 70
But should the lack of evidence of a pregnant woman's intention be
automatically construed as a willingness to want the pregnancy now that
she is dead? 71 What is the justification for the "medical rescue" of the
fetus? It is argued that
[t]he conditions for beneficence-based duties of fetal rescue will
often be unmet, both because sustaining the pregnancy is not al-
ways a clear gain to the born child and because it may impose a
substantial burden on the woman.72
There are difficulties in identifying what exactly are the special rela-
tionship duties that would require a woman to have her body used as a
fetal incubator without her consent. As of yet, no one has been required
to give up a vital organ to save the life of a close family member be-
cause of special family relationships. Physicians are not permitted to
harvest vital organs from a dead person without explicit consent-from
that person, or the next-of-kin, to save lives. To use a woman's corpse
as a fetal incubator without the woman's prior consent would be analo-
gous to saying that a woman loses her right to refuse to donate organs
upon her death by becoming pregnant. Women do not lose their consti-
tutional or common law rights by becoming pregnant.73
Using a woman's corpse as a fetal incubator creates a dangerous
precedent that could be used to justify using female somatic support in
other related cases, for example, when the pregnant woman is comatose
or in a permanent vegetative state (PVS). The female body in these cases
may become the most suitable somatic support for a fetus at any stage of
its development, especially because comatose or PVS pregnant women
can no longer complain, insist that treatment be terminated, or refuse
procedures that may benefit their fetuses. Moreover, ignoring the preg-
nant woman's personhood and using her body as an inert receptacle of
fetal life reduces her gestational work to services that she is expected to
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See generally Hilde L. Nelson, The Architect and the Bee: Some Reflec-
tions of Postmortem Pregnancy, 8 BIOETHICs 247 (1994).
72. See generally id.
73. See George J. Annas, Death With Dignity, in HEALTH CARE CHOICES FOR
TODAY'S CONSUMER 297-308 (M.S. Miller ed. 1995).
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provide. This lack of self-awareness transforms the pregnancy into an
"imitation of pregnancy 74 and destroys the unique human element that
makes pregnancy a valued and worthwhile experience.
Posthumous pregnancy is most problematic when the woman dies late
in pregnancy and the fetus needs one or two more weeks of gestation for
a greater chance of survival. But even in this case, it would be wrong, as
a routine procedure, to sustain the woman's body for the fetus' benefit
in the absence of the woman's written or oral consent.
B. Aborted Fetuses as Genetic Mothers
It has been suggested that aborted female fetuses might eventually be
used as a source for oocytes in oocyte donation programs.75 One possi-
bility is to remove oocytes from ovaries of aborted fetuses, mature them
in vitro, and use them as donor oocytes for couples who need eggs as
part of their in vitro fertilization effort. Another possibility is to remove
ovaries from aborted fetuses and transplant them into women who lack
ovarian functions so the transplanted tissue could contribute to the
woman's normal reproductive cycle. At present, the use of fetal eggs for
conception is hypothetical and speculative at best. 76 Its rationale has
been that, if sperm from a dead man can be used for posthumous in-
semination, so too should eggs from aborted fetuses.
However, the male reproductive model cannot apply to women. The
"donation" of fetal eggs cannot be equated with the "donation" of sperm
by an adult male who willingly provided the sperm and at the very least
consented to procreate and to have genetic offspring.77 A child produced
with a dead man's sperm may never have the opportunity to meet the
genetic father, but may have the possibility of knowing who he was,
74. See Nelson, supra note 71, at 259.
75. See ASHER SHOSHONE ET AL., FERTILITY & STABILITY 449, 449-51 (1992);
Roger G. Gosden, Transplantation of Fetal Germ Cells, 9 J. ASSISTED REPROD.
GENETICS 118, 118-23 (1992).
76. See ETHICS COMM. OF THE AMER. SOC. FOR REPROD. MED., ETHICAL
CONSIDERATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 67 (1997).
77. This Article's comments on the use of eggs from aborted fetuses closely
reflect a draft proposal by George J. Annas which he presented in March 1994, at
the regular meeting of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine, March 1994. The final statement on the "use of fetal oocytes in
assisted reproduction" was developed by the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine's Ethics Committee and accepted by the Board of Directors on January
10, 1997.
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how he lived, and what was he like. But dead fetuses will never be inde-
pendent living persons. They are, in a sense, "unknowable." They can
never make a procreative decision. To use their eggs would be wrong
because it undermines the moral precept of procreation as a voluntary
choice. Moreover, it is problematic that the woman, who has an abor-
tion, may also have the ability to make procreative decision for her
aborted fetus.
By consenting to the use of fetal eggs for infertility treatment, a
woman can terminate her pregnancy and still procreate by having ge-
netic grandchildren. This puts the woman in an impossibly paradoxical
position regarding her procreative decision: She must agree not to have
a genetic child, and at the same time to have genetic grandchildren.
Since the "father" of the fetus may also have genetic grandchildren as
the result of the egg donation, his permission must also be sought. The
child that results will have a dead fetus as a genetic parent. Under no
circumstances will the child ever be able to learn more about its genetic
mother other than she was a dead fetus. Whether a child's interest is
served by having an aborted fetus as a mother is highly problematic. It
would be shortsighted to view the harvesting of dead fetuses' bodies in
isolation from our moral attitude towards ourselves and our notion of
human dignity. The fact that the child would not be born, but for the use
of fetal eggs, does not justify their use, any more than it would justify
using cloning, animals as gestators of human fetuses, or the creation of
human-animal hybrids that would not otherwise be born.
78
IV. PUBLIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Unlike Great Britain, Canada, Australia, or France, the United States
has yet to adopt uniform rules for assisted reproduction. Americans fun-
damentally believe that procreative choice should be left to individuals,
couples, and their physicians, with no government interference.79
The first comprehensive legislative report on assisted reproductive
technologies was issued this year by the New York State Task Force on
Life and The Law.80 Particularly, the Task Force recommends that the
retrieval of gametes from deceased persons should not be permitted
without the written consent of the gamete providers. An exception to
78. See Annas, supra note 60, at 124.
79. See George J. Annas, The Shadowlands - Secrets, Life and Assisted Repro-
duction, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 935, 935-39 (1998).
80. See N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 295.
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this rule is made when the person seeks to retrieve the gametes, through
judicial proceedings, and demonstrates extraordinary circumstances that
would justify gamete retrieval without consent. The Task Force empha-
sizes the importance of mutual informed consent over the fate of em-
bryos produced by both partners' gametes, and establishes guidelines to
determine degrees of control over embryos after the death of one or both
partners. For example, the Task Force said that if the partner whose
gametes were used to create the embryos dies, the surviving partner
should have control over the embryos, subject to any instructions the
deceased partner left at the time the embryos were created. But if the
partner who did not contribute gametes to the embryos dies, the surviv-
ing partner should be given full control over the embryos. In the case of
embryos created entirely with donor gametes, both partners should re-
tain joint decision making authority over the embryos. If one partner
dies, the surviving partner may use the embryos only according to the
instruction the deceased partner left. If both partners die leaving no in-
structions, the embryos should be discarded. Gamete banks should have
guidelines in place to address situations of divorce, disagreement or
death of gamete providers, and consult professional organizations, such
as the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, for advise. In case
of orphan or abandoned embryos, gamete bank policy should specify
how the facility determines when embryos are abandoned, and the pro-
cedure the facility follows for their disposition.
Essentially, posthumous reproduction with sperm, eggs, or embryos is
permissible, subject to written consent by one or both gamete providers.
These recommendations follow the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine's guidelines,8' which stress the importance of informed con-
sent of gamete providers, and guidelines in other countries such as Great
Britain8 2 and Australia.
8 3
81. See ETHICS COMM., supra note 76, at Supp. 1S-9S.
82. The Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990 (HFEA) requires
that "[c]onsent to the storage of gametes or embryos must . . . state what is to be
done with the gametes if the person who gave the consent dies." John Aston, et al.,
Widow Has no Legal Right to Family - Court Told, PRESS ASSOC. NEWSFILE, Oct.
3, 1996. Although this requirement permits posthumous transfer of gametes, it
does not mandate such transfer at the request of the surviving partner. See id. The
Act also requires that fertility treatment centers take into account "the welfare of
any child who may be born as the result of fertility treatment, including the need of
that child or father." See id. The findings of the government-sponsored Warnock
Commission upon which the 1990 Act was based, stated that posthumous repro-
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In Canada, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technolo-
gies recommends that embryos stored for a couple's own use should not
be used to create a pregnancy after the death of either partner, regard-
less of the couple's stated intent.84 The Commission expresses concern
about inheritance and the well-being of children born after one or both
of their parents have died. "[T]he death of either partner is a clear and
practical limit. '8 5 Couples who do not use assisted reproduction cannot
procreate after one partner dies, therefore neither should couples who
have used assisted reproduction. This would also prohibit the use of
gametes for reproduction after the gamete providers have died.
This basic position was also adopted in France. The 1994 Bioethics
Law, for example, explicitly forbids the use of gametes for posthumous
reproduction. 86 The law states that assisted reproduction is only permit-
ted when "the request is made by a couple in reproductive age, married
or living together for at least two years." Both would-be parents must
agree to the reproductive treatment. The reason is that reproductive
choices by individuals and their physicians, if left unregulated, would
likely result in destructive social behaviors and procreative habits, and
foster a greater cultural tolerance for all that is "unnatural" in human
reproduction. It would encourage "a radical genetic and technological
control over life itself and the making of human beings. 87 Although it
took more than ten years for the French Government to address the is-
duction should be "actively discouraged," but fell short of suggesting that it be
outlawed. See id. More recently a British court addresed a case involving a widow
who sought to use the sperm retrieved from her husband after he had become co-
matose. See id. The HEFA concluded that "no legal authority we are aware of
supports the proposition that there is a right to found a family with one's deceased
husband," and would not authorize the gamete bank to release the sperm. See id.
The British High Court agreed with the HFEA, but held that the wife could not be
permitted to use the sperm because her husband had never given his written con-
sent to the retrieval, storage, or use of his gametes. See id. The British statute that
governs assisted reproduction clearly requires a man's written consent to the use of
his sperm. See id.
83. See generally COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL, ETHICAL & LEGAL
ISSUES ARISING FROM IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, REPORT ON THE DISPOSITION OF
EMBRYOS PRODUCED BY IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (1984).
84. See MINISTER OF GOV'T SERV., ROYAL COMM'N ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES, PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT 598-99 (1993).
85. Id.
86. See Bioethics Law of July 29, 1994, J.O., July 30, 1994, 11056-68.
87. Id.
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sues of medically assisted reproduction, this legislation, which includes
criminal penalties, may have been possible because the French health
care system is centralized and relatively closed.88
Human reproduction is not about sperm, eggs, or even embryos. It is
about people, their hopes and dreams in fulfilling their lives by having a
child. Informed consent in reproductive decision is crucial. But it is not
sufficient to justify any reproductive arrangement. This is particularly
true in posthumous reproduction where consent to reproduce is only the
beginning, not the end of procreative rights, where considerations of the
possible effects on the living participants in reproduction, and the wel-
fare and interests of children must be addressed. The making of babies
should not be reduced to the possibility of using sperm or eggs. Babies
are not products. It should be assumed that a decision to bring a child
into the world implies a willingness to raise and care for the child. It
would be naive to think that the relationship established by the "gift of
life" between individuals and their infants is unimportant or irrelevant to
the interests of children, and that children's interests could be consid-
ered separately from parental interests.
Children are not born in a social vacuum. Their interests are so inex-
tricably intertwined with those of their parents that they cannot be con-
sidered separately. Even the strongest defenders of reproductive rights
would likely find it ethically and socially unacceptable to use the eggs
of the recently discovered 500 year-old Peruvian mummy, a fifteen year-
old Inca girl sacrificed to appease the volcano gods. 89 This is because
almost no one really thinks that babies are like products fabricated in
factories. Posthumous reproduction that separates children from their
genetic parents is a destructive practice that subverts the very notion of
parenthood. It is unfair to children and undermines the value and mean-
ing of human reproduction. If the welfare of children is taken seriously,
uniform state legislation should forbid the use of gametes for posthu-
mous reproduction, including the use of eggs from aborted fetuses for
reproduction. This may require criminal penalties to be effective.
The United States, like most Western countries, has experienced an
increase in the use of reproductive technologies, including requests for
88. See Evelyne Shuster, What Americans Can Learn from the French Experi-
ence in Health Care, in HEALTH CARE CRIsIS? THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS 210-22
(R. Misben et al., eds., 1995).
89. See John N. Wilford, Mummy Tells a Story of a Sacrifice, Scientists Say,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at Al.
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sperm retrieval from dead men. 90 In a time of "epidemic infertility," 9'
cultural changes, more perhaps than technological advances, have
caused some individuals to find it acceptable to want children after
death. But the values in human reproduction cannot be reduced simply
to utility. They are values of family relationship, parental responsibili-
ties, and human dignity. However, in the posthumous gift of life, these
values are lacking.
The French court in Claire G. was correct when it stated that the so-
cial and moral issues raised by posthumous reproduction extend beyond
the interests of progenitors to considerations of the interests and welfare
of children that result from the practice. By contrast, the American court
in Kane, was mistaken when it upheld Kane's intent to procreate after
his death, and ruled that gamete provider's consent was sufficient to
justify the posthumous use of sperm for reproduction.
Despite all her efforts to compensate for her son's lack of father,
Jenny Fields realized that she badly failed. To everyone, her son re-
mained "an illegitimate child." Although Garp grew up to become a re-
spected writer, it did not change the "original insult" of his conception
and birth. To many, he was forever "suspect." As with posthumous re-
production, it is not the resulting child who is a suspect, but the adults
who engage in this highly questionable practice, and the society that
permits it.
90. See Fishman, supra note 51, at 306.
91. See Nelson, supra note 71, at 166.
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